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Executive Summary 
Some countries fail to ensure that their citizens and businesses make an appropriate contri-
bution to the financing of public tasks. But not all countries with a low tax ratio automati-
cally fall into this category. As a first observation, there is a well established positive rela-
tionship between a country’s ability to collect taxes and its development level. Hence, it 
does not make much sense to assess a low-income country’s tax effort by comparing it to 
the levels of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or to 
certain absolute values. Governments, donors and international organisations need to be 
able to judge the performance of tax systems in a broader context of development, govern-
ance and international cooperation.  
The tax performance assessment (TPA) introduced in this paper seeks to give a comparative 
overview of the tax performance of developing countries, based on aggregate data and 
country-specific information. This should put governments, donors and international or-
ganisations in a better position to decide on tax reform programmes and aid modalities. The 
analysis proceeds as follows: 
— First, the TPA relates the 2007-08 tax ratio (tax revenue as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product – GDP) of a large number of countries to their GDP per capita. It es-
tablishes a trend (or regression) line and determines the distance of each country from 
this line. According to their relative position, countries are then grouped into three 
broad categories: average tax performers, high tax performers and low tax performers. 
— Second, the exercise is repeated for two additional observation periods, 1997-99 and 
2001–03 (roughly ten and five years from 2007–08), to identify countries changing 
categories over time. 
— Third, we assume that governments with “easy” access to alternative sources of finance 
do not have a strong incentive to engage in cumbersome domestic tax collection. The 
TPA therefore looks at non-tax revenue in general and grants of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in particular. 
— Fourth, we analyse the governance of countries with a low tax performance in order to 
distinguish between those states that collect few taxes because societies want to have a 
low tax ratio and those cases where other aspects may be more important than the po-
litical will of the citizens. 
Empirical findings 
For the observation period 2007–08 we gathered data on a total of 177 countries. Of these, 
36 qualify as high tax performers, whereas 41 fall in the low tax performing group. The 
remaining 100 countries are considered average performers. The results of our analysis en-
able us to discern some regional patterns:  
— Many Latin American and Caribbean countries find themselves below the trend line. 
The only high tax performers in this region are Brazil and Guyana. 
— Another part of the world where low tax performance clearly prevails is South and 
Southeast Asia. Here, high tax performers are virtually absent. 
— Africa presents some mixed results, several countries falling into the high tax perform-
ance category, while others count as low tax performers.   
— Finally, high tax performers predominate in Western Europe and in many formerly 
socialist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
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For the observation periods 1997–99 and 2001–03 we gathered data on 158 cases. A total of 
53 countries changed categories between 1997–99 and 2007–08. Of these, 32 registered a 
downward trend, while 21 improved their relative position. Again, some regional patterns 
emerge:  
— Many South and Southeast Asian countries moved to the low tax performers’ group. 
An important exception is China, which changed from low to average performance.  
— In a similar fashion, nine sub-Saharan African countries moved to lower categories, 
with only Liberia changing from average to high performance. 
— In other regions, the picture is more ambiguous. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
for instance, three countries fell from average to low tax performance, while another 
three countries changed from low to average and one country (Brazil) from average to 
high performance.  
Alternative sources of revenue: Non-tax revenue is higher for low tax performers in all 
income groups, but total revenues and total expenditures are lower. This means that the lack 
of tax revenue is only partly offset by alternative sources of financing.  
As regards other sources of financing, it appears that low tax performers do not receive 
much foreign aid (ODA grants); nor do they have much access to external borrowing. More 
than half of them (23 countries) finance less than 1 per cent of GDP with ODA grants, 
whereas the world average stands at 6.7 per cent. Only six of the 41 low tax performers 
score higher than the world average in terms of ODA grants. In contrast, low-income high 
tax performers clearly receive more aid and more loans from the international community. 
Governance: The size of the public sector and the quality and quantity of public services 
may be the outcome of choice by a society. If a country is governed in a democratic and 
transparent manner, there is no reason to talk about revenue mobilisation problems, even if 
the country has a low tax ratio. However, the combined picture produced by the Polity IV 
democracy index and the World Governance Indicators (WGI) Voice and Accountability 
Index suggests that low tax performing countries are less democratic, regardless of income 
group. There are only four low tax performers with a positive rating in both indices: Pa-
nama, India, the Dominican Republic and Timor-Leste. 
It can also be deduced from the WGI Government Effectiveness index that only a few low 
tax performers have a public sector capable of implementing public policies in an orderly 
and transparent way. Thirteen of 40 countries (there are no data on Palau) achieve scores 
above the world mean. Among these are several small high-income countries as well as 
some rather non-democratic or blatantly authoritarian states such as Singapore and Kuwait. 
Two countries, Colombia and the Philippines, qualify as “democracies” in the Polity IV 
index and are rated above the Government Effectiveness mean, but register below-average 
scores in the Voice and Accountability Index. They could be considered borderline cases. 
Hence, there are just two countries (Panama and India) with positive scores in all three in-
dicator sets. In fact, of the lower-middle-income and low-income countries with low tax 
performance, India alone has high governance rankings, and it would most probably be 
among the average tax performers if its revenue data included subnational governments. 
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Finally, we consider whether countries face circumstances that may inhibit tax collection 
regardless of the government’s political will. In particular, we look at the number of battle-
related deaths as a proxy for civil unrest or war in a country; and at the number of displaced 
persons as a proxy for major humanitarian catastrophes (e. g. natural disasters or violent 
conflicts). In general terms, low tax performers have a higher death toll in armed conflicts 
and a larger number of displaced persons. This is especially true of the lower-middle-
income and low-income groups, indicating that low tax performance may also be related to 
special circumstances. 
To summarise the findings, we can identify three relatively distinct groups of low tax 
performing countries:  
— a first group consisting of nine states with high non-tax revenue, low ODA grants and, 
in most cases, low governance ratings; 
— a second group composed of six countries with high levels of governance and small 
public sectors. Three other countries with medium levels of governance and a small 
government can also be ascribed to this group;  
— a third group of 22 countries that generally have low non-tax revenue, low levels of 
governance and, in most cases, relatively high levels of ODA or external borrowing. 
The reasons for the low tax performance of the first two groups are relatively clear: the first 
has no strong incentive to engage in tax collection (because of its high non-tax revenue), 
and the second has no preference for collecting much in the way of taxes (as indicated by 
high to medium governance levels). The reasons for low levels of tax collection in the third 
group are less apparent and probably more diverse. Lack of capacity (ineffective tax ad-
ministration) or tax effort (for instance, resistance to tax policy reform, high levels of “per-
mitted” tax evasion) could be possible explanations.  
This is consistent with the finding that 16 of the 22 countries in the third group were aver-
age tax performers ten years ago. Most are Asian or sub-Saharan African countries. In a 
period of growth and expanding public revenues worldwide, it appears that these states 
were in a weak position to improve their fiscal standing in line with the rest of the world.  
To sum up, states with a relatively low or diminishing tax performance in our analysis do 
not automatically qualify as “bad” or “defective” cases. It is possible that their tax ratio is 
low because they enjoy access to alternative sources of finance, or because societies have 
chosen to limit the range of state action. Besides this, tax performance may be shaped by 
specific conditions or other factors, such as natural disasters and violent conflicts. 
Development policy should consider these findings on a case-by-case basis. It must not 
focus solely on the tax ratio, but consider a partner country’s tax system as a whole, in a 
broader governance context. However, the results presented above seem to indicate that 
regional patterns may play a role in at least some parts of the world. This lends additional 
weight to those initiatives which raise the issue of domestic revenue mobilisation on a mul-
tilateral level. 
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In the context of bilateral development cooperation, states with persistently and signifi-
cantly low tax ratios should be encouraged to be more active in fiscal terms and to step up 
revenue collection. For those countries with low governance levels, this goes beyond ex-
pressions of political will on the part of ruling elites. Among other issues, governments and 
donors need to address the following questions:  
— Is there a record of (failed) attempts to improve tax collection? Is there a consensus 
among political actors with regard to the causes of success or failure?  
— How has external intervention influenced the tax regime in the past? For instance, pres-
sure to liberalise the economy may have eroded revenues from trade taxes. 
— Who loses and who benefits from tax reform? What are the incentives for change?  
More reliable data for large numbers of countries would be necessary if this type of analysis 
was to be expanded to include, for instance, subnational revenues and the characteristics of 
tax administration. Even today, however, development policy can find support in a number 
of general indicators or approaches presented in this paper. 
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1 Introduction 
Countries with a low tax yield or lax enforcement of tax laws are running out of time. 
Such international players as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the World Bank and the G20 are calling for more determined action to 
combat tax evasion and avoidance. With the world still fighting the effects of the global 
financial and economic crisis, there is growing pressure on tax havens to increase the 
transparency of their tax systems and put an end to unfair competitive practices. Develop-
ing countries, too, are being urged to do more to mobilise domestic resources rather than 
rely on a constant inflow of official development assistance (ODA) funds.1  
Some countries clearly fail to ensure that their citizens and businesses make an appropriate 
contribution to the financing of public tasks. In such cases there are a number of reasons 
for changing the development portfolio, reducing ODA or even stopping cooperation alto-
gether (von Haldenwang / Krause 2009). But not all countries with a low tax ratio auto-
matically fall into this category. Governments, donors and international organisations need 
to be able to assess the performance of tax systems in a broader context of development, 
governance and international cooperation.  
Surprisingly, there is at present no such comprehensive and comparative approach to the 
tax system performance of developing countries, although several donors and international 
organisations are gathering data on tax revenues, the composition of tax systems and the 
quality of tax policy and administration.2 Most developing countries are the subject of at 
least some country-specific information on tax systems and revenues. At the same time, 
there is a growing body of macro-quantitative research on the relationship between tax 
systems or tax revenues and foreign rents (including ODA flows), per capita GDP and 
other variables.3 
However, hardly any tools exist for comparing the tax systems of individual countries, 
linking tax performance to other factors of political and socio-economic development. Nor 
is much information available on the evolution of tax systems over time. Generally speak-
ing, much of the in-depth information available is not truly comparative,4 and much of the 
comparative information available is not truly in-depth.  
                                                 
1  According to the 2005 United Nations Millennium Project report “Investing in Development,” low-
income countries should raise their domestic revenues by an additional 4 per cent of GDP by 2015. Si-
milarly, the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development includes a pledge to “enhance tax re-
venues through modernized tax systems, more efficient tax collection, broadening the tax base and ef-
fectively combating tax evasion.” See also OECD (2010); EC (2010). 
2  The most important providers of this kind of information are the OECD (reports and databases, espe-
cially on sub-Saharan Africa), the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIAs) 
and Doing Business Reports, the European Commission’s Fiscal Blueprints, the Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) Reports and the Collecting Taxes database funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). 
3  For recent contributions to these debates, see Carter (2010); Hart (2010); Aizenman / Jinjarak (2009); 
Morrison (2009); Fuest / Riedel (2009); Besley / Persson (2009); Knack (2008); Gambaro / Meyer-
Spasche / Rahman (2007); Gupta (2007). 
4  It could be argued that PEFA and CPIA scores do lend themselves to (within-country or cross-country) 
comparisons. De Renzio (2009) and PEFA Secretariat (2009) discuss this issue with regard to PEFA 
scores. 
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As a result, governments and donors usually approach the issue of tax reform in develop-
ing countries on a strict case-by-case basis. Tax-related criteria of donor programmes or 
new aid modalities are defined without the potential of available comparative data being 
fully tapped. Typically, the tax ratio (tax revenue as a percentage of GDP) in developing 
countries is assessed by comparing it to certain absolute threshold values, regional aver-
ages or OECD tax ratios. None of these procedures, however, appears to be convincing, as 
they do not take any account at all of the conditions and development levels of individual 
countries.  
Against this background, more elaborate approaches seek to measure the tax effort by tak-
ing account of specific country characteristics, such as per capita income, the trade / GDP 
ratio or the relative size of the agricultural sector.5 These variables, however, may also be 
subject to change. For instance, Aizenman / Jinjarak (2009) find evidence that trade liber-
alisation brought upon developing countries in the course of globalisation has led to a shift 
from “easy-to-collect taxes” (tariffs, seigniorage) to “hard-to-collect taxes” (Value Added 
Tax – VAT, income taxes). Poor countries, which are usually more dependent on tariffs, 
often find it difficult to compensate for shrinking revenues after tariff cuts. This is espe-
cially true of countries where institutional quality is low.  
The tax performance assessment (TPA) introduced in the following sections relates tax 
ratios to development levels (proxied by per capita income) as the first step of the analy-
sis. In subsequent steps it seeks to give a comparative overview of the tax performance of 
developing countries, based on aggregate and country-specific information. This should 
put governments, donors and international organisations in a better position to decide on 
tax reform programmes and aid modalities. 
The TPA relates observed values to cross-country trends instead of comparing them with 
predicted values (“tax capacity”) on a case-by-case basis. This approach is adopted be-
cause of the difficulty of determining the “real” tax capacity of individual states. The ca-
pacity of states to collect taxes is affected not only by economic variables, but by many 
other political, social and geographical factors. Low “tax effort” (in the specific sense in-
troduced above) may not be the only reason for low tax revenue. Rather than focusing on 
aggregate results, the TPA also seeks to give easy-to-access information on individual 
countries or groups of countries. Because of this focus, additional efforts have been de-
voted to data collection. 
The TPA does not discuss the composition of tax systems or the quality of specific taxes. 
Many African countries, for example, have a rather high tax ratio, largely because they 
receive a major share of their revenues from trade taxes, which are said to be particularly 
“distorting” owing to their small tax base. However, we cannot gauge the developmental 
effect of these tax revenues by looking at market distortions alone: we also need to con-
sider how tax revenues are spent, what form the incentive structure for the private sector 
takes and so on.  
                                                 
5  See OECD / AfDB / UNECA (2010, 94–96) for data on the tax effort of 42 African countries; Piancas-
telli (2001) for a sample of 75 countries; Teera / Hudson (2004) for a sample of 120 countries; Gambaro 
/ Meyer-Spasche / Rahman (2007) for a sample of 65 aid-recipient countries. 
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The following section summarises the underlying analytical narrative of the TPA and dis-
cusses the problem of data quality and accessibility. Section 3 presents the findings of our 
analysis. The concluding section, Section 4, summarises the results and addresses the 
question of how development cooperation partners should handle the findings presented in 
this paper. 
2 Assessing tax performance – concepts and data 
2.1 The analytical narrative  
State capacity includes the capacity to collect taxes. States with low per capita income do 
not, as a rule, meet the administrative and institutional requirements for a tax system at 
OECD level. Public expenditure, on the other hand, rises with higher development levels, 
generating pressure to mobilise revenue.6 An appropriate appraisal of a state’s efforts to 
tax its citizens must therefore take its level of development into account. A positive rela-
tionship between tax ratio and per capita GDP (as a proxy for development) has been 
demonstrated in the literature since the 1960s (Musgrave 1969; Chelliah 1971; Tanzi 
1992; Piancastelli 2001; Teera / Hudson 2004; Gambaro / Meyer-Spasche / Rahman 
2007).  
Hence, the first assumption made in this paper is that the capacity of the government of 
country X to raise tax revenue increases with that country’s development level: 
ri = α + β log gi + εi,  i = 1,N,     (1) 
where ri is total tax revenue as a share of GDP in country i, gi is the GDP per capita in 
country i, and εi is the residual, which includes all the other factors affecting ri.  
This assumption does not establish a causal relationship between tax ratio and develop-
ment level. It shows, however, that there is little sense in assessing a low-income coun-
try’s tax effort by comparing it to OECD levels or to certain absolute values. At the same 
time, linking tax revenue to development levels leads to more realistic expectations con-
cerning changes in tax revenue. Drastic alterations from one year to another are typically 
the outcome of external shocks, or the product of data corruption and misreporting. 
The TPA relates the tax ratios of a large number of countries to their logged GDP per cap-
ita. It establishes a trend line and determines the distance of each country from this line. 
According to their position relative to the trend line, countries are then grouped into three 
categories: average tax performers, high tax performers and low tax performers. Grouping 
countries into these broad categories gives us a first idea of how they fare in terms of tax 
collection at a given point in time. By choosing 2007/08 as the most recent observation 
period, we cover the years before the outbreak of the world economic crisis, with its rather 
distorting impacts on the public finances of many developing and developed countries. We 
are also able to gather data for a large group of countries.7  
                                                 
6  This tendency is known as “Wagner’s Law”, see Musgrave (1969, 73–75); de Ferranti et al. (2004, 250). 
7  For each of the 177 countries of our sample, data from 2007 and 2008 were averaged and then compiled 
into one series. For ten countries (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Gabon, Sao 
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Besides gaining an impression of recent tax performance, we want to know how tax per-
formance changes over time. For instance, it could be that a country is still below the trend 
line, although it has increased its tax ratio in recent years. Only long-term observation will 
provide information on the fiscal development of a country or group of countries. We 
build two additional series for the periods 1997–99 and 2001–03 (roughly ten and five 
years from 2007/08). As governments, donors and international institutions are likely to be 
especially interested in countries with a persistently low, or even diminishing, tax per-
formance, we take a closer look at these two groups in our analysis. 
The second assumption guiding our analysis concerns the relationship between tax and 
non-tax revenue. The tax effort approaches mentioned above identify additional factors 
that influence the tax ratio. The TPA follows this approach in that it assumes that govern-
ments with “easy” access to alternative sources of finance do not have a strong incentive 
to engage in cumbersome domestic tax collection.  
We consider non-tax revenue in general and ODA grants in particular. On the one hand, 
exporters of non-renewable energy sources (oil, gas) and minerals (copper, gold) may not 
have to achieve high tax ratios in order to finance public services. A state that receives 
substantial rents from oil or gas exports will feel little inclination to resort to the laborious 
business of depriving its citizens of some of their income when it can finance its essential 
functions as things are. The best example of this is the Persian Gulf states, some of which 
maintain single-digit tax ratios despite having medium to high per capita incomes.  
On the other hand, states heavily dependent on ODA grants may be tempted to refrain 
from additional domestic revenue mobilisation – unless ODA conditions (such as co-
financing schemes or tax collection targets) change the incentive structure, or longer-term 
political perspectives lead governments actively to seek independence from ODA inflows. 
There is a growing body of research on these issues, but findings are still inconclusive 
(Carter 2010).  
The third assumption concerns the governance dimension of revenue mobilisation. A 
low tax yield is not always the outcome of some kind of error or defective governance. 
Different societies have different views on what states should do and how much they 
should cost. Of the OECD member countries, the USA and Japan stand out as having a 
rather low tax yield, whereas the Nordic countries are famous for their high tax ratio. Nei-
ther does our trend line necessarily represent the “golden middle” between under- and 
overtaxation, nor does every society aspire to become another Sweden or Denmark.  
Consequently, we should distinguish between states that collect few taxes because citizens 
want to have a low tax ratio and those where other aspects may be more important than the 
political will of the citizens. Factors such as democratic participation, free and fair elec-
tions and regime stability determine the capacity of societies to reach political decisions 
based on the common interest, while such factors as administrative capacity, level of cor-
ruption and rule of law determine the capacity of public administrations to implement 
these policies.  
Societies with low levels of governance are typically not in a position to choose and im-
plement a tax system from a common interest perspective. Hence, in cases where low tax 
performance coincides with low levels of governance we find it hard to believe that the tax 
                                                                                                                                                   
Tome and Principe, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Zimbabwe), one of the two ob-
servations was missing. In these cases we took the remaining one. 
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ratio is the product of transparent, democratic decision-making and capable public admini-
stration. Rather, we would assume that in these cases some powerful groups are imposing 
a tax system according to their particular interests – or that they are successfully obstruct-
ing tax reform initiatives. In addition, we consider it easier in political terms to have a low 
tax ratio than a high one. We therefore assume lower levels of governance to be more 
conducive to lower tax ratios. 
To summarise, states with a relatively low or diminishing tax performance in our analysis 
do not automatically qualify as “bad” or “defective” cases. It is possible that their tax ratio 
is low because they enjoy “easy” access to alternative sources of finance, or because so-
cieties have chosen to limit the range of state action. Besides this, tax performance may be 
shaped by specific conditions, such as natural disasters or violent conflicts (Everest-
Phillips 2010, 76). Against this background, the TPA should not be seen as a single ana-
lytical tool. Rather, it is designed to put country-specific information in a broader context 
and to sharpen the comparative focus of aggregate analysis. 
2.2 The data challenge 
Gathering data on actual tax revenue collection in developing countries is still quite a dif-
ficult task. For one thing, the informal sector accounts for a significant part of the eco-
nomic activity of many developing countries (Olken / Singhal 2009). This may lead to 
effective tax rates and the tax ratio being overstated (Aizenman / Jinjarak 2009, 668). 
Some states do not report GDP or revenue data at all. Various states have changed to ac-
crual accounting, while many others still rely on cash accounting (though this difference is 
less relevant to revenue than to expenditure). Furthermore, data series often use different 
definitions of governments or different classifications of revenues – sometimes simultane-
ously and without prior explanation. 
Levels of government: From the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance 
Statistics (IMF GFS), the standard source of information on public finances in developing 
countries, we take general government (GG) as the broadest category in terms of revenue 
statistics. It comprises central government (CG), state and local governments, social secu-
rity funds and non-market non-profit institutions. However, quite a few countries (espe-
cially developing countries) report data only on CG (sometimes including social security 
funds), not on GG. As a result, most research papers that consider developing countries 
use CG data (see, for example, Teera / Hudson 2004; Gambaro / Meyer-Spasche / Rahman 
2007). 
For our purposes, however, this would not be appropriate, since we want to take account 
of all government revenues in as many countries as possible. Subnational levels are impor-
tant tax collectors in some countries, especially in the higher-income group, although in 
most of the low- or lower-middle-income countries they play only a minor role: in 2008, 
the mean difference between GG and CG tax revenue among lower-middle-income coun-
tries was 1.31 per cent of GDP (in those 19 countries that report both data in IMF GFS), 
while in higher-income countries it was 5.76 per cent (27 countries). Thus, relying solely 
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on CG data would tilt our findings substantially “in favour” of the lower-income countries 
in our sample.8 
Classification of revenues: The GFS distinguish four kinds of general government reve-
nue: taxes, social contributions, grants and other revenues. “Grants” refer to grants from 
international organisations or governments of third countries. “Other revenues” refer to 
property income, sales of goods and services, fines, voluntary transfers and others. The 
lines between categories may be somewhat blurred, as countries interpret them differently. 
For instance, some countries (such as Australia) do not report social security contribu-
tions, since they treat them as taxes. Another challenge arises from differences in the 
treatment of revenues from extractive industries, which may appear as “taxes” in some 
cases and as “other revenues” in others.  
Against this background we opt for a broad view of “tax revenue,” taking it to cover taxes 
and social contributions. Again, omitting one of these sources would distort the overall 
picture of tax revenue. Social security contributions are hardly a relevant source of reve-
nue in low-income countries, but it is obvious that social security is considered a public 
task in most countries with higher tax ratios. In Germany, for example, more than EUR 80 
billion is transferred from the government budget to the public pension system each year. 
Omitting these revenues from our calculations would therefore not be justified.9 
Data sources: For GDP per capita, we take data from the World Development Indicators. 
We consider GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars and GDP per capita in constant 
2005 Purchasing Power Parity units (PPP). Both variables produce similar results (see 
Table 1 below). We consider constant 2000 US dollars to be more appropriate for our 
analysis, because (i) it is a more “neutral” indicator of levels of development (differences 
between constant US dollars and PPP already take account of differences in development 
levels due, for instance, to cheaper services in developing countries), (ii) the sample is 
slightly larger (177 compared to 174 countries) and (iii) the indicator appears to be more 
transparent, as determining PPP is in itself a complex operation and subject to debate.  
For tax revenues, we take data from the following sources (ranked according to priority): 
(i) OECD, (ii) Eurostat, (iii) UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC, or CEPAL for its Spanish name), (iv) IMF GFS GG, (v) IMF GFS CG, 
(vi) individual country data from IMF “Article IV consultation” and “selected issues” re-
ports (for observation periods 1997–99 and 2001–03), (vii) Asian Development Bank, 
(viii) Collecting Taxes database. In the last two sources, the definition of tax revenue is 
often unclear. We found various cases where GG and CG data were used side by side, or 
where social contributions were treated incoherently. 
                                                 
8  Of course, including GG data for only a part of our sample (and CG data for the rest) also produces 
biased results, albeit on a much smaller scale. In our analysis we check for such bias by adjusting the tax 
revenue of those countries that report only CG with local tax revenue estimates, using data from Ivany-
na / Shah (2010). See section 3.2 of this report. 
9  To check for sample bias, we also consider tax revenue without social contributions. We find that the 
slope of the trend line changes, but there are few changes with regard to our three categories. See section 
3.2 for more details. 
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Consequently, there are 189 countries in our sample for the construction of the trend line 
(see Table 1). GDP per capita is available for only 177 of these countries, but the missing 
data mostly concern small countries and territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Abbreviations: GG – general government; CG – central government; OECD – Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development; CEPAL/ECLAC – UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean; IMF GFS – International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics; AsDB – 
Asian Development Bank; ColTax – Collecting Taxes. For all sources, tax revenue is for general govern-
ment (unless otherwise specified), with social contributions included, average of 2007 and 2008, in per 
cent of GDP. AsDB and ColTax do not specify their definitions. GDP/capita, USD – GDP per capita in 
constant 2000 US dollars, thousands, average of 2007 and 2008. GDP/capita, PPP – GDP per capita in 
constant 2005 PPP units, thousands, average of 2007 and 2008. 
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3 Results of the analysis 
3.1 Classification of countries 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of tax ratio (tax revenue as  per cent of GDP) versus log GDP 
per capita for 177 countries.10 Table 2 contains the results of the regression analysis. The 
relationship between tax ratio and log GDP per capita is statistically significant, even 
though the effect is rather small: in statistical terms, an increase of 10 per cent in log GDP 
per capita would increase the tax ratio by about 0.34 additional percentage points.  
 
 
                                                 
10  See Table 14 in the annex for a list of ISO country codes. 
Figure 1: Relation between tax ratio and log GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note X-axis: tax revenue in per cent of GDP (= tax ratio), 2007/08. Y-axis: log GDP per capita in con-
stant 2000 US dollars as of 2008. Data see Table 1. The solid black line is the trend line (fitted values). 
The broken grey lines are the lower and upper boundaries of the 95 per cent confidence interval, i. e. there 
is a 95 per cent probability that the “real” trend line is located within the range marked by the broken 
lines. N=177. 
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With the approach we have chosen, 36 of 177 countries qualify as high tax performers, 
whereas 41 countries fall into the low tax performing category. The remaining 100 coun-
tries are average performers. Table 3 is a list of low and high tax performers,11 while Fig-
ure 2 shows the results on a global map of tax performance. 
We propose to call those countries whose tax ratio lies within the 95 per cent confidence 
interval of the trend (or regression) line (i) average tax performers,12 countries with a tax 
ratio above the 95 per cent confidence interval (ii) high tax performers and those with a 
tax ratio below the 95 per cent confidence interval (iii) low tax performers.13  
The results of our analysis reveal some regional patterns. As can be seen from the map, 
many Latin America and Caribbean countries find themselves below the trend line, with 
Guatemala, Venezuela, Paraguay, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Colombia in the 
group of low tax performers. The only high tax performers in this region are Brazil and 
Guyana. Another part of the world where tax performance is particularly low is South and 
Southeast Asia. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Sri Lanka, 
India, Nepal and the Philippines are among the low performers. In this part of the world, 
high tax performers are virtually absent (Papua New Guinea and a few small island states 
are exceptions). 
 
 
                                                 
11  See Table 13 (Annex) for a list of all countries ranked according to their distance from the trend line. 
12  In addition, average tax performers can be distinguished as a function of their location above (average-
high) or below (average-low) the trend line. 
13  There are, of course, other possible ways to set the boundaries, such as raising or lowering the confi-
dence interval or defining absolute values (for instance, ± 5 per cent tax ratio). We consider the confi-
dence interval a more appropriate measure than absolute values, because a specific variation in tax ratio 
means something different for countries with lower levels of tax revenue as against countries with 
higher levels. Low-income Burundi is therefore classified as a high tax performer with a tax ratio 6.01 
per cent GDP above the trend line, whereas high-income Malta, 7.98 per cent distant from the trend line, 
is an average tax performer. See Figure 1, Table 13 (Annex). Furthermore, changing the confidence in-
terval to, say, 90 per cent or 99 per cent would make our classification rather useless, since the vast ma-
jority of countries would fall outside or in the average tax performer category. 
Table 2: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – regressions 
 
 
 
 
Note *** – significant at 1 per cent level. Dependent variable: tax ratio as defined in Table 1. Right-hand 
side variable: column (I) – log GDP/capita, constant 2000 USD; column (II) – log GDP/capita, constant 
2005 PPP – see definitions in Table 1. Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
robust. 
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Table 3: Low and high tax performers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Based on the estimation (I) from Table 2, res. less lb – residual from the regression less lower 
boundary of the 95 per cent confidence interval, res. less ub – residual from the regression less upper 
boundary of the 95 per cent confidence interval. The countries are sorted according to their distance from 
the lower (left column) or upper (right column) boundary of the 95 per cent confidence interval. 
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In contrast, Africa shows some mixed results, with countries such as Ghana, Burundi, Li-
beria, Morocco and Algeria being among the high tax performers, while various Central 
African countries (such as Chad, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Nigeria) count 
as low tax performers. Finally, average-high and high tax performance predominate in 
Western Europe and in many formerly socialist states of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. The most important high-income countries with tax ratios below the trend 
line (but still within the 95 per cent confidence interval) are the USA, Japan, Ireland and 
Switzerland. 
3.2 Robustness checks and specifications 
We performed several robustness checks and looked for alternative specifications of our 
main variables, GDP per capita and tax revenues (see Table 4). None of these exercises 
led to substantially different results.  
Sensitivity to outliers: As Figure 1 and Table 3 show, Lesotho is an exceptional tax per-
former, yet with a relatively low level of development. It derives 50 per cent of its tax 
revenues from the Southern Africa Customs Union, which may not be directly related to 
Lesotho’s own tax effort. Nonetheless, an outlier of this kind may skew the results of the 
whole regression. Similarly, the oil states Kuwait, Bahrain and Libya are clearly outliers 
in terms of low tax collection. We therefore repeated the analysis without Lesotho and the 
other three countries. The results of the two calculations are presented in columns (i) and 
(ii) of Table 4. In both cases there are only minor differences in the resulting lists, with 
four countries changing categories in the first exercise and seven countries in the second. 
Figure 2: Tax performance in the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data as presented in Figure 1. 
no data 
low tax performer 
below trend, insign. 
above trend, insign. 
high tax performer 
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Alternative functional forms: In our main specification we take the logarithm of GDP 
per capita as a proxy for a country’s development. Alternatively, level data or GDP per 
capita squared (columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 4) can be used.14 All coefficients remain 
highly significant, even though the data explain less variation in tax revenue (R2 is higher 
when log GDP per capita is used). This results in much broader lists of low and high tax 
performing countries. Yet the “leaders” of the lists do not change compared to our main 
specification. 
 
Alternative tax revenue measures: A broad definition of tax revenue was introduced 
above, covering general government information (where available) and including social 
security contributions. There are, however, alternative approaches: (i) a first option would 
be to use tax revenue without taking social contributions into account, while (ii) a second 
                                                 
14  We also ran several semiparametric spline-models to check for more complex non-linear relationships 
and found that our log-linear model fits the data best. 
Table 4: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – alternative specifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Column (i): regression excluding Lesotho. Column (ii): regression excluding Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Libya. Column (iii): GDP/capita instead of log GDP/capita. Column (iv): GDP/capita squared. Column 
(v): tax ratio excluding social contributions. Column (vi): local tax revenue added for countries with only 
CG data. *** – significant at 1 per cent level. Dependent variable: columns (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) – tax ratio as 
defined in Table 1; column (v) – tax rev. no soc. contr., see Table 1 for definition; column (vi) – tax ratio, 
adjusted, see Table 1 for definition. GDP/capita is in constant 2000 USD, see definition in Table 1. Esti-
mation method: all columns – OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust in all columns. In/out 
comparison is with the lists in Table 3. 
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option would consist in adjusting for local tax revenue in those countries which report 
only CG data (columns (v) and (vi) of Table 4).  
(i) In the first case (excluding social contributions) the trend line becomes flatter, as ex-
pected, since many high-income countries rely heavily on social contributions, whereas 
many developing countries do not report social contributions at all. As a result, many 
European countries drop out of the group of high tax performers, to be replaced by coun-
tries with lesser reliance on (or different treatment of) social contributions (for example, 
Botswana, Namibia, Georgia, Iceland and Malta). At the same time, the list of low tax 
performing countries changes only slightly: the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Bahamas and Palau would move into the average performers 
group, whereas Costa Rica, Madagascar, Greece, Sierra Leone, El Salvador and Ecuador 
would join the low tax performers group. 
(ii) The second alternative is to adjust the tax ratio for local tax revenue in the case of 
those countries that report only CG data. Non-reporting of GG data is clearly skewed to-
wards lower income countries.15 But is the difference between CG and GG relevant to 
them?  
— Data from Ivanyna / Shah (2010) reveal that, in 2005, the average subnational gov-
ernment (SNG) expenditures of the countries that report GG data was 23.7 per cent of 
total expenditures (which are comparable to total revenue). For countries that report 
only CG data, the figure is 9.7 per cent, and for countries whose data we derive from 
AsDB or ColTax, it is 9.6 per cent.  
— Subnational tax revenues are typically much lower than expenditures, especially in the 
case of the poorer countries. Ivanyna / Shah (2010) have estimated the vertical gap – 
the difference between a country’s SNG expenditures and own SNG revenues (ex-
cluding intergovernmental transfers). According to these estimates, SNG in countries 
which report GG finance 56 per cent of their expenditures with own revenues. SNG in 
“CG only” countries finance 57 per cent, and SNG in “AsDB and ColTax” countries 
finance 49 per cent. 
— To give an example, the average tax revenue of “CG only” countries in our sample 
was 16.3 per cent of GDP in 2007/2008. If their presumed GG tax revenues were 
comparable to the GG expenditures reported by Ivanyna / Shah (2010), local govern-
ment in an average “CG only” country would collect 9.7 per cent * 0.57 = 5.5 per cent 
of GG tax revenues. This means that, by using CG data, we are underestimating the 
actual GG tax revenue for an average “CG only” country by 16.3 per cent * 0.055 =  
0.9 per cent. Even OECD and Eurostat data often differ by more than 0.9 per cent. 
As expected, the results of the regression with the “adjusted” data are practically the same 
as in the main specification (even the point estimates are very close). Colombia and the 
Philippines change their position marginally (from “close to average” low tax performers 
to “close to low” average tax performers). Yet there is one major change: India makes a 
significant leap from the low to the average tax performing group: as a federal state, it has 
a much higher degree of fiscal decentralisation than other developing countries. However, 
since the data we use in this exercise stem from 2005 and earlier, and there is no direct 
                                                 
15  Of the 113 countries in the sample (excluding AsDB and ColTax sources), 35 report only CG data. 
Higher-income countries: 2 of 37; upper-middle-income countries: 4 of 23; lower-middle- and lower-
income countries: 29 of 53. 
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measure of local tax revenue for CG states, we do not use this adjustment in the main 
specification. 
Different effects in different income groups: Is the relationship between tax ratio and 
level of development different in poorer countries from that in richer countries? To answer 
this question we split the sample in two: countries with lower GDP per capita (less than 
the median) and countries with higher GDP per capita (more than the median) (see Table 
5). We find that the slope is flatter for richer countries (the point estimates are economi-
cally different), which is not surprising, given that we use logged GDP. Yet the difference 
is not significant in statistical terms (at a 5 per cent significance level).  
 
A second way of identifying non-linearities in the relationship between tax ratio and in-
come is to regress the tax ratio on income group dummies as classified by the World Bank 
(see column (iii) of Table 5). The group of low-income countries is chosen as the baseline. 
The biggest jump is from the low-income to the lower-middle-income group, after which 
the relationship flattens and then jumps again from upper-middle-income to high-income 
countries. This pattern supports our choice of log GDP per capita as a proxy for economic 
development (since it also assumes non-linearity between income and tax ratio of roughly 
the same kind). 
3.3 Tax performance: changes over time 
Also of interest to our paper are changes in tax performance over time. The sample in-
cludes 1905 observations for tax revenue in the period 1997–2008. There is at least one 
non-missing observation in 193 countries, 10 being the average number of available time 
observations for a country. Most of the missing observations are in sub-Saharan African 
and small Caribbean countries. In general terms, data show that tax revenue is increasing 
slightly over time, in line with GDP per capita, which is consistent with our story (see 
Table 6). 
Table 5: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – poor vs rich countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Note *** – significant at 1 per cent level. Dependent variable: tax ratio as defined in Table 1. Right-hand 
side variables: columns (i) and (ii) – log GDP/capita, USD; column (iii) – dummies for countries’ income 
groups as classified by the World Bank. Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
robust. 
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Poor countries are underrepresented in the sample in the earlier observation periods, as the 
higher figures in column (16) compared to column (15) reveal. This raises concerns about 
sample selection and the possibility of comparing the relative tax performance of a coun-
try over time: If the samples of the previous observation periods were qualitatively differ-
ent from 2007–08, a country’s change in position vis-à-vis the trend line could be due to 
sample selection rather than its own development (not even relative to the other countries). 
However, the fact that the missing observations before 2007 mostly concern poor coun-
tries does not necessarily mean that those countries are low tax performers. It is impossi-
ble, of course, to test this directly (since the relevant data are the data that are missing), 
but there are some indirect checks (see Table 7). For instance, we checked for such vari-
ables as lead selection indicator and the number of years that a country i reports tax reve-
nue. We also reran the main regression for our 2007–08 sample, but excluded those coun-
tries which did not report in 2006. Finally, we assumed that there was indeed a sample 
selection problem, and reformulated our main specification with only those countries that 
reported data in 1997–99 as well as in 2001–03 (158 countries, not shown in Table 7). 
None of our tests produced results significantly different from our original argument, 
which means that there is no evidence of sample selection.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Tax revenue data patterns by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Columns 2–13 – number of observations for groups of countries. Column 14 – mean tax revenue as  
per cent of GDP. Column 15 – mean GDP/capita (thousands of constant 2000 US dollars) for all observa-
tions. Column 16 – mean GDP/capita when tax revenue is available. Regions: 1– South Asia, 2 – Europe 
and Central Asia, 3 – Middle East and North Africa, 4 – Sub–Saharan Africa, 5 – Latin America and 
Caribbean, 6 – East Asia and Pacific, 7 – North America. Income groups: 1 – high income, 2 – upper 
middle income, 3 – lower middle income, 4 – low income. Countries are classified in accordance with the 
World Bank. 
Souce: Data as presented in Table 1. 
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Table 8 contains the results from the regression analysis, and Figure 3 shows the scatter 
plots for 1997–99 and 2001–03. In both cases, the trend line is steeper than in 2007–08 
(even though statistically the difference is small).  
 
 
Table 9 summarises the changes of category for each period compared to 2007–08. As can 
be seen, a total of 53 countries changed categories between 1997–99 and 2007–08. Of 
these, 32 registered a downward trend, with 21 moving from average to low and 11 from 
high to average tax performance. In contrast, 21 countries improved their relative position, 
with 11 moving from low to average and another 10 from average to high tax perform-
ance. Again, these changes do not necessarily imply an increased effort to collect taxes (or 
the lack of it) in each individual case. In the growth period from 2003 to 2008 in particu-
lar, global economic activity helped many countries to improve their domestic revenue 
collection without any major intervention in the area of tax policy or administration. Some 
countries may have benefited more from this situation than others. 
Table 7: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – testing for sample selection 
 
 
 
 
 
Note *** – significant at 1 per cent level. Dependent variable: in all columns tax ratio as defined in Table 
1. Sample used: columns (i) and (ii) – all observations; column (iii) – 2008, excluding countries which did 
not report tax revenue in 2006. Right-hand side variables: log GDP/capita, USD; sit – selection indicator, 
1 if rit is non-missing, 0 if rit is missing, where rit is tax ratio for a country i in a year or group of years t. 
Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. 
Table 8: Tax ratio and log GDP per capita – 1997–99 and 2001–03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Column (i) – years 1997–99. Column (ii) – years 2001–03. *** – significant at 1 per cent level. 
Dependent variable: tax ratio as defined in Table 1. Right hand side variable – log GDP/capita, USD. 
Estimation method: OLS with inverse probability weighting based on log GDP/capita, USD. LR – likeli-
hood ratio. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between tax ratio and log GDP per capita, 1997–99 and 2001–03 
 
1997–99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001–03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note On the left, scatter plot for 1997–99. On the right, scatter plot for 2001–03. N = 158. For each sub-
figure, X-axis: tax revenue in per cent of GDP (= tax ratio) as defined in Table 1. Y-axis: log GDP per 
capita in constant 2000 US dollars for the corresponding period. Data presented as in Table 6. 
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Table 9: Tax performance progress matrix: 1997–99 and 2001–03 vs 2007–08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data as presented in Figure 3 
As a result, several countries changed their relative position in the world distribution of 
tax performance, but not their absolute performance: Nepal, the Central African Republic, 
Eritrea, Malawi and Haiti increased their tax ratio over time without positive changes in 
GDP/capita and yet ended up in the low performing group. These countries did make pro-
gress in tax collection, but not as fast as the world average. With less certainty, the same 
can be said of Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Romania, Bangladesh and 
Cambodia. 
Some regional patterns are also worth mentioning. For instance, among those who im-
proved their performance are two transformation countries in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia: Kazakhstan and Russia. On the other hand, six countries in that region changed to 
lower categories (Slovak Republic, the Baltic States, Romania and Uzbekistan). 
Many South and Southeast Asian countries also lost ground and moved to the low tax per-
formers’ group, examples being Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Laos, the Philippines, Indo-
nesia, India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. An important exception is China, which changed 
71 countries
76 countries
21 countries 
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from low to average performance. Similarly, nine sub-Saharan African countries moved to 
lower categories (e. g. Chad, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Malawi and Namibia), 
while Liberia alone changed from average to high performance. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, three countries moved from average to low tax per-
formance (Paraguay, Haiti and Colombia), while four (Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and El Sal-
vador) changed from low to average and one (Brazil) from average to high performance.16 
In the Middle East / North Africa (MENA) region, three countries managed to move to 
higher categories (the United Arab Emirates, Morocco and Oman), while Syria and 
Yemen joined the low performance group.  
An increase in non-tax revenue could have been a major reason for the decline in the tax 
performance of Malaysia, Colombia and Vietnam. The Central African Republic, Malawi 
and Haiti experienced significant increases in ODA grant inflows in the period considered, 
which could be an indicator of the substitution of foreign aid for tax effort in these coun-
tries. For the remaining countries changes in ODA grants (in  per cent of GDP) were either 
insignificant or even negative. 
3.4 Tax performance: some stylised facts 
In this section we take a closer look at the various tax performance groups. Figure 4 com-
pares the mean scores achieved by low, average and high tax performing countries (within 
each graph) broken down into income groups (different graphs), relating them to four 
categories:  
(i) public finance (tax ratio, total revenue, public expenditure); (ii) alternative sources of 
financing (non-tax revenue, ODA grants, net flow of external debt); (iii) governance (Pol-
ity IV democracy and regime durability indices, World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness Indices); and (iv) special cir-
cumstances (battle-related deaths, displaced persons). 
In Table 10 we present the results of regressions on the above-mentioned indicators, 
where the dependent variables are GDP per capita and a dummy equal to 1 if a country is 
a low tax performer. The results are generally consistent with Figure 4. Low tax perform-
ers have significantly lower total revenue and total expenditure (columns (i) and (ii)). Fur-
thermore, their governments are less democratic and less effective (columns (v), (vii) and 
(viii)). Yet in terms of population size, regime durability, foreign aid or indebtedness they 
are not statistically different from the rest of the world. 
 
 
                                                 
16  It should be noted, however, that many sub-Saharan African and smaller Caribbean states could not be 
included in the analysis because of the lack of data. 
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Figure 4: Groups of tax performers, stylised facts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Depicted are mean values by tax performance group (within each graph) and income group (differ-
ent graphs). First row: taxes – tax revenue, per cent GDP; revenue, expense – GG revenue and expendi-
ture, per cent GDP (sources – see Table 1). Second row: non-tax revenue – GG revenue minus tax reve-
nue, per cent GDP (source as for tax revenue), oda grants – ODA grants + other grants to government 
(GG), per cent GDP (sources – OECD, IMF GFS); ext. debt flow – net public and publicly guaranteed 
external borrowing,  per cent GDP (source – WDI). Third row: polity – POLITY2 index of democracy 
(source – Polity IV project); durab. – durability of regime, years (source – Polity IV project); WGI v&a – 
Voice and Accountability Index*10 (source – WGI); WGI gov.eff. – government effectiveness index*10 
(source – WGI). Fourth row: displaced popul. – internally displaced persons, per cent total pop. (source – 
WDI); deaths in battle – battle-related deaths, per cent pop.*1000 (source – WDI). All figures are aver-
ages of 2007–2008. Number of countries in each group: high income – 44 (low tax performance – 7, 
average – 25, high – 12); upper-middle income – 44 (low – 8, average – 27, high – 9); lower–middle 
income – 45 (low – 14, average – 21, high – 10); low income – 42 (low – 11, average – 27, high – 4) 
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Table 10: Low tax performers vs the rest of the world: regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note * – significant at 10 per cent level, ** – significant at 5 per cent level, ***– significant at 1 per cent 
level. Years analysed in all regressions – 2007–08. See Figure 4 for definitions of dependent variables. 
Right-hand side variables – GDP/ capita, thousands USD and dummy equal to 1 if a country is low tax 
performer (see Table 1 for the list). Estimation method in all regressions: OLS. Standard errors are het-
eroscedasticity-robust. 
 
Several facts are worth noting: 
— As non-tax revenue, which includes property income, is higher for low tax performers 
in all income groups, the lack of tax revenue is partly offset by alternative sources of 
financing. However, non-tax revenue does not fully offset low tax revenue: total reve-
nues and total expenditures are lower in low tax performing countries than in the other 
two categories, even though low tax performers from the upper-middle income group 
spend more and low tax performers from the lower-middle income group obtain more 
revenues than average tax performers. 
— As regards the other sources of financing, it appears that low tax performers do not 
receive much foreign aid (ODA grants) or have much access to external borrowing. In 
contrast, average or high tax performing low-income countries clearly receive more 
aid and also, in the case of the four high tax performers, more loans from the interna-
tional community. The stock of external debt also shows them to be far more indebted 
(see Table 11).  
— According to the Polity IV and the WGI Voice and Accountability indicator sets, gov-
ernments are less democratic in low tax performing countries, regardless of income 
group., They also tend to be less effective (as measured on the WGI Government Ef-
fectiveness index), although the difference appears to be smaller. No clear pattern of 
regime durability emerges. 
— In general terms, low tax performers also have a higher death toll in armed conflicts 
and a larger number of displaced persons. This is especially true of the lower-middle-
income and low-income group, indicating that low tax performance may also be re-
lated to special circumstances, such as violent conflicts or natural disasters, and not 
only to low tax effort in the specific meaning discussed above. 
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Table 11: Low tax performers: General information and public finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Columns: gdp/cap – GDP per capita, thousands of constant US 2002 dollars (source – WDI); reg – 
region code and inc gr – income group, as classified by the World Bank (see definitions in Table 6); tax – 
tax revenue, per cent GDP (source – see Table 1); rev, exp – total government (GG) revenue and expendi-
ture, per cent GDP (sources – same as tax); gr’s – ODA grants + other grants to government (GG), per 
cent GDP (sources – OECD, IMF’s GFS); debt flow – public and publicly guaranteed external borrowing, 
per cent GDP (source – WDI); debt stock – present value of total external debt, per cent GDP (source – 
WDI). All figures are averages of 2007–2008. 
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3.5 Alternative sources of revenue 
As pointed out in Section 2, governments finance some of their expenditures from sources 
of revenue other than taxation. Major alternative sources are property income, which also 
includes dividends and withdrawal of profits from state enterprises, and grants from for-
eign governments and international organisations. ODA grants include direct transfers to 
governments, transfers to other stakeholders and the writing-off of debts. They may serve 
as substitutes for domestic revenue mobilisation either through direct budget support or 
through a reduction in expenditure needs for programmes directly funded with ODA. In 
addition, governments may engage in borrowing to raise funds. Our aim in this section is 
to explore whether low tax performers use alternative sources of revenue and what sources 
they “specialise” in. Information on low tax performers is summarised in Table 11. 
In 2007–08 only five of 41 low tax performers – Timor-Leste, Libya, Kuwait, the Repub-
lic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea – registered total government (GG) revenue above the 
world average (32.9 per cent of GDP), but 16 countries achieved above-average rates of 
non-tax revenue (total revenue minus tax revenue, the world average being 10.1 per cent 
of GDP). As shown in Figure 4, low tax performers have considerably higher non-tax 
revenues in three of four income groups – though not in the low-income group. For some 
of the countries, the obvious reason for this is that their governments collect most of their 
revenue from state-owned enterprises dedicated to the extraction of natural resources 
(mainly oil) – Libya, Kuwait and Bahrain being the most prominent examples. 
As noted above, low tax performers do not receive a great deal of foreign aid. More than a 
half of them (23) finance less than 1 per cent of GDP with ODA grants, whereas the world 
average stands at 6.7 per cent. Only six of the 41 countries – Timor-Leste, Micronesia, 
Palau, the Central African Republic, Haiti and the Comoros – score higher than the world 
average for ODA grants. Of the 16 high non-tax revenue countries, six (Timor-Leste, Mi-
cronesia, the Comoros, Bhutan, Chad and Sudan) receive more than 3.4 per cent of GDP 
(half the world average) in ODA grants. The remaining countries of this group obtain non-
tax revenue from other (domestic) sources. 
The pattern described here is further supported by the net debt flows of low tax perform-
ers. Of the ten high non-tax revenue, low-ODA countries, only Gabon receives external 
loans above the world average (11 per cent of GDP in 2007–08, the world average stand-
ing at 1.9 per cent). From the group of countries with high non-tax revenue and high ODA 
inflows, Bhutan and the Comoros stand out because they obtain numerous loans in addi-
tion to grants. Borrowing is also an important source of revenue for Lebanon (10 per cent 
of GDP in 2007–08) and Panama (2.41 per cent), both being average non-tax revenue 
countries. But only in the cases of Lebanon and Gabon can it be said that loans were a real 
alternative to tax revenue in 2007–08. 
3.6 Governance levels 
The size of the public sector and the quality and quantity of public services may be the 
outcome of choice by a society. If a country is governed in a democratic and transparent 
manner and if the government implements public policies effectively, there is no question 
of revenue mobilisation problems, even if the country has a low tax ratio. Yet we suspect 
that the standing of a majority of the low tax performers, especially those from the lower-
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middle-income and low-income groups, in tax matters coincides with below-average gov-
ernance ratings.  
We consider several governance indicator sets in order to analyse low tax performers in 
this respect. First, we take a Polity IV democracy index (POLITY2) and the WGI Voice 
and Accountability indicator set to determine whether political decision-making is democ-
ratic and participatory. Then we use the WGI Government Effectiveness dimension to see 
whether public policies are implemented effectively. We also check whether the durability 
of political regimes has a bearing on tax performance – which, from our findings, does not 
seem to be the case. Finally, we look at two other WGI indicator sets to see if our findings 
are endorsed. The ratings are presented in Table 12.  
Figure 5 shows how the low tax performers fare with regard to three governance indices.  
— According to the Polity IV democracy index, 13 of 35 countries qualify as “democ-
racies”17 in this group. The Comoros, India and Panama with a score of +9 are fol-
lowed by the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Indonesia, Paraguay and the Philip-
pines with a score of +8. Colombia, Lebanon and Timor-Leste score +7, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka +6. A total of 15 countries fall into the “anocracy” categories, while seven 
countries qualify as outright autocracies. For those 22 countries with a score below 
+6, we would not have much confidence in the common interest orientation of the po-
litical decision-making process, but detailed political analysis may prove us wrong.  
— The results on the WGI Voice and Accountability index are even more worrisome.18 
Only nine countries achieve a higher-than-average rating (above zero), and five of 
them are small high-income countries19 not included in the Polity IV index (such as 
Liechtenstein, Bermuda and the Bahamas). Of the larger countries, only four (Pa-
nama, India, the Dominican Republic and Timor-Leste) score better than the mean. 
Twenty countries range between zero and -1, and another eleven lie between -1 and  
-2.5. Thus the overall picture produced by the two indices suggests that only a minor-
ity of the low tax performers may have decided on their tax systems from a common 
interest perspective. 
To assess whether a society has the tax system it wants, it is not enough to consider the 
political process. Governments must also be able to implement the policies that have been 
adopted in an orderly and transparent way. Where this is not the case, it can be assumed 
that taxpayers (especially the wealthier and more powerful ones) are finding ways to 
evade or avoid tax or that tax laws are not being properly enforced.  
                                                 
17  As the Polity IV index covers only countries with a population above 500,000, there are data on only 35 
of the 41 low tax performing countries. The index assigns scores ranging from +10 to -10. (i) Countries 
with a score of +10 are called “full democracies.” (ii) Those ranging from +9 to +6 are “democracies.” 
(iii) Scores from +5 to +1 refer to “open anocracies” – an “anocracy” being a neither fully democratic 
nor fully autocratic regime with only a limited ability to provide public services and ensure its own sur-
vival.. (iv) Countries with a score from 0 to -5 are classified as “closed anocracies,” and (v) those with 
scores from -6 to -10 are “autocracies.” See Marshall / Cole (2009, 8–12) for the description. For the 
data, see www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (accessed 3 Aug. 2010).  
18  The index covers all our low tax performers with the exception of Palau. It assigns a score between 
approx. +2.5 and approx. -2.5, with the mean at zero and the standard deviation at one. See Kaufmann / 
Kraay / Mastruzzi (2009, 15). The data can be found at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index. 
asp (accessed 3 Aug. 2010). 
19  With the exception of Micronesia, which is an upper-middle-income country. 
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Table 12: Low tax performers: Governance, size, special circumstances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Columns: pol – POLITY2 index of democracy (source – Polity IV project); dur – durability of re-
gime, years (source – Polity IV project); v&a – Voice and Accountability Index (source – WGI); gov eff – 
Government Effectiveness Index (source – WGI); pop – population in millions (source – WDI); gdp – 
GDP, billions of constant US 2000 dollars (source – WDI); deaths – battle-related deaths, thousands per 
cent pop. (source – WDI); displ pop – internally displaced persons, per cent pop. (source – WDI). All 
figures are averages of 2007–2008. 
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Figure 5: Low tax performers relative to the world average: Governance scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note Top: Polity IV democracy index; scores range from 10 to -10. Middle: WGI Voice and Accountabil-
ity Index; scores range from approx. 2.5 to approx. -2.5. Bottom: WGI Government Effectiveness Index; 
scores range from approx. 2.5 to approx. -2.5.   
See definitions in Table 12 and footnotes 17 and 18. Scores applied to low tax performing countries. Non-
low tax performing countries are not coloured. 
 
Democracy (Polity IV)
Voice & Accountability 
Government Effectiveness 
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— From the WGI Government Effectiveness Index we deduce that only a few low tax 
performers have a capable public sector. Thirteen of 40 countries achieve scores 
above zero (though India, the Philippines and Colombia only by the narrowest of 
margins). They include several small high-income countries mentioned above as well 
as some rather non-democratic or blatantly authoritarian states such as Singapore, Ma-
laysia, Bahrain, Bhutan and Kuwait. Two countries, Colombia and the Philippines, 
qualify as “democracies” in the Polity IV index and are rated above the mean in terms 
of Government Effectiveness, but register below-average scores on the Voice and Ac-
countability Index. They could be considered borderline cases.  
Consequently, just two countries (Panama and India) score positively in all three indicator 
sets, and neither of them is a typical developing country. In fact, of the lower-middle-
income and lower-income countries with low tax performance, India is the only one with 
high governance rankings, and it would most probably jump to average tax performance if 
subnational tax collection were taken into account.  
Checking for two other WGI indices (Corruption and Regulatory Quality) as possible 
proxies for public-sector capability shows little difference – the correlation between these 
indices and Government Effectiveness is almost perfect. Only Bhutan scores higher than 
the mean in Government Effectiveness, but has a lower score for regulatory quality. How-
ever, Colombia and Panama register high levels of corruption according to the WGI. Ob-
viously, corruption is a major factor for tax administration and tax compliance. If we took 
this finding into account, our “group” of high governance, low tax performers would be 
narrowed down to India plus the Philippines as a borderline case. 
Figure 6 categorises the low tax performing countries by (1) non-tax revenues, then (2) 
ODA grants and (3) levels of governance. In this figure, the interpretation of governance 
differs from the discussion above: a high level of governance is assigned to a country if it 
scores higher than the world average in both WGI indicator sets, Voice and Accountability 
(V&A) and Government Effectiveness (GE). Six countries fall into this category: our 
“champions” India and Panama, and four small high-income countries. A medium level of 
governance is ascribed to nine countries with ratings above the world average in just one 
of the indices. The rest (25 countries) are below average in both indices.  
The first thing to note from the figure is that no countries have high non-tax revenues and 
high levels of governance. Four high non-tax revenue countries score high on GE, but low 
on V&A (Colombia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Bhutan), while the reverse is true of two others 
(Timor-Leste and Micronesia). The rest of the medium to high governance countries have 
non-tax revenues below the world average. These findings are consistent with the general 
perception that rentier states (with high non-tax revenue) are usually “cursed” by low lev-
els of governance and democracy.  
The second conclusion to be drawn from Figure 6 is that most of the 17 low tax perform-
ers with significant grant levels (above 1 per cent of GDP) score low in terms of govern-
ance. Only three countries (Timor-Leste, Micronesia and Bhutan) achieve a medium gov-
ernance rating. In contrast, of the 23 countries with low levels of grants, 12 achieve me-
dium or high governance ratings. As has been said above, most of them (nine) have non-
tax revenue below the world average, which means that they do not substitute alternative 
sources of financing for low tax revenue with alternative sources of financing. 
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Finally, we check to see if countries face circumstances that may inhibit tax collection, 
regardless of the government’s political will. In particular, we consider the number of bat-
tle-related deaths as a proxy for civil unrest or war in a country and the number of dis-
placed persons as a proxy for major humanitarian catastrophes (e. g. natural disasters or 
violent conflicts).20 From these indicators it appears that special circumstances may have a 
major influence on tax performance in several countries, including Sri Lanka, Chad, the 
Central African Republic, Pakistan, Sudan, Timor Leste and Colombia.  
                                                 
20  The data can be found in Table 12. Four of 22 countries with low non-tax revenue and low levels of 
governance suffered from armed conflicts in 2007-08: Sri Lanka (number of victims: 0.3 per million of 
population), Chad (0.09), Pakistan (0.03), Sudan (0.01). Of the other countries, only one (Colombia) 
suffered significant losses in armed conflicts in 2007-08 (0.06 per million). At the same time, nine coun-
tries in this group reported displaced persons: Central African Republic (4.6 per cent of the population), 
Timor-Leste (3.66), Sudan (3.0), Sri Lanka (2.4), Chad (1.6), Lebanon (1.6), Yemen (0.4), Nepal (0.2), 
Pakistan (0.1). Again, Colombia is the only other country with a significant number of displaced persons 
(6.7 per cent of the population). 
Figure 6: Low tax performers by categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note All low tax performers except Palau (no data on governance). * – Bermudas (BMU): no data on 
revenue / expenditure. Non-tax revenue: high – countries above world average (10.1 per cent GDP); mod-
erate – countries between world average and half of world average; low – countries below half of world 
average. Grants: significant – countries with grants above 1.0 per cent GDP; low – countries with grants 
below 1.0 per cent GDP. Governance: high – countries that score above world average in WGI v&a as 
well as gov eff; medium – countries that score above world average in one of the two WGI indices; low – 
countries that score below average in both WGI indices. Sources: see Tables 11 and 12. 
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4 Conclusion 
The findings presented above enable three relatively distinct groups of low tax performing 
countries to be identified:  
— a first group consisting of nine states with high non-tax revenue and low ODA grants: 
Libya, Kuwait, Equatorial Guinea, Bahrain, Gabon, Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela and Co-
lombia; 
— a second group composed of six countries with high levels of governance and small 
government: the Bahamas, India, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Panama and Hong Kong 
(marked blue in Figure 6, last row). Three other countries with medium levels of gov-
ernance and small government can also be ascribed to this group. They are the Do-
minican Republic, Malaysia and Singapore;  
— a third group comprising countries with generally low levels of governance, low non-
tax revenue and, in most cases, relatively high levels of ODA grants or external bor-
rowing, though both indicators may still be low compared to the world average 
(marked red in Figure 6). 
The reasons for the first group’s low tax performance are relatively clear: their high non-
tax revenues give them no real incentive to engage in tax collection. It can be argued that 
the second group has no preference for collecting much in the way of taxes, as indicated 
by high to medium governance levels. Furthermore, almost all the countries in this group 
are high-income or upper-middle-income countries. India is the only lower-middle-income 
country in this group, and it would most probably not be a low tax performer if its subna-
tional tax collection were taken into account.  
The reasons for the third group’s low tax performance are less apparent and probably 
more diverse. A lack of capacity (ineffective tax administration) or tax effort (for instance, 
resistance to tax policy reform, high levels of “permitted” tax evasion) are possible expla-
nations, at least for those countries which have a poor government effectiveness record. 
Various countries in this group also receive ODA grants well above the world average 
(Timor-Leste, Micronesia, the Comoros, the Central African Republic and Haiti). In these 
cases, crowding-out effects caused by ODA may be one reason for low tax performance.  
It should be noted that 16 of the 22 countries belonging to the third group were average 
tax performers ten years ago. Most of them are in South or Southeast Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. In a period of growth and expanding public revenues worldwide, it ap-
pears that these states were in a weak position to improve their fiscal standing in line with 
the rest of the world.  
Development cooperation should consider these findings on a case-by-case basis. Above 
all, donors should keep in mind that low (or declining) tax performance does not necessar-
ily equal bad tax performance, just as high tax performance is not necessarily good. The 
preceding sections have shown that many factors intervene in the tax performance of indi-
vidual countries. Also, differences between low and average tax performers are rather 
small at the margins, as the figures in Table 13 (annex) show, and there may be quite a 
few average (or high) tax performers with urgent tax reform problems to solve.  
Hence, governments, donors and international organisations must not focus solely on the 
tax ratio, but consider the tax system as a whole: its composition, its development over the 
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years, its redistributive effects and its impacts on economic activity and public participa-
tion. A meaningful and realistic approach to public finance reform must also take the 
broader governance context into account.  
At the same time, the results presented above seem to indicate that regional patterns may 
play a role in at least some parts of the world. This lends additional weight to those initia-
tives which raise the issue of domestic revenue mobilisation on a multilateral level. 
In the context of bilateral development cooperation, a country’s position in relation to the 
trend line (or the change in this position over a number of years) can be taken as a first 
indicator. States with persistently and significantly low tax ratios should be encouraged to 
be more active in fiscal terms and to step up revenue collection. For those countries with 
low governance levels, this goes beyond expressions of political will on the part of ruling 
elites. The questions which governments and donors need to address include the follow-
ing:  
— Is there a record of (failed) attempts to improve tax collection? Is there a consensus 
among political actors on the causes of success or failure?  
— How has external intervention influenced the tax regime in the past? For instance, 
pressure to liberalise the economy may have eroded revenues from trade taxes. 
— Who loses and who benefits from tax reform? What are the incentives for change?  
More reliable data on many countries would be necessary if this type of analysis was to be 
expanded to include, for example, sub-national revenues and the characteristics of tax ad-
ministration. Even today, however, development policy can find support in a number of 
general indicators or approaches. Recent initiatives to expand the PEFA on tax matters, to 
gather data on developing countries’ tax efforts (see OECD / AfDB / UNECA 2010) and 
to increase the number of EU Fiscal Blueprints in developing countries will without doubt 
contribute to further improving the data situation.  
In countries with poor tax collection, stagnant or worsening indicators and a “badly” com-
posed tax regime the focus of development cooperation should be shifted to the reform of 
tax systems. According to OECD figures, less than 0.1 per cent of official development 
cooperation funds was spent on taxation-related tasks worldwide in 2007. Even though the 
scale of resources is not in itself a particularly meaningful criterion, this is undoubtedly 
too little for any substantial influence to be brought to bear on the existing incentive struc-
tures. 
Is it appropriate to stop development cooperation with these countries altogether? Not 
necessarily, but the nature of cooperation should be adjusted in such cases. States that are 
highly fragile, are engaged in a military conflict or post-conflict situation or have diffi-
culty in collecting taxes for structural reasons should not be uncoupled from development 
cooperation, but greater emphasis in that cooperation should be placed on strengthening 
their tax systems. Governments should be supported in their efforts to increase tax revenue 
(through the linking of financial allocations to improvements in the tax system, for in-
stance). However, in the absence of success and where the partner countries’ decision-
makers obviously lack the will, donors must ask themselves how cooperation with such 
governments can be justified in development policy terms and continue to be legitimised 
at home. 
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Additional country data  
 
 
 
Table 13:  All countries, distance from the trend line 
Above the trend line Below the trend line 
Lesotho 39.18 Spain 5.68 Oman -0.04 Philippines -6.47 
Belarus 25.17 Germany 5.37 Benin -0.36 Sri Lanka -6.67 
Moldova 17.14 Dominica 5.34 Cote d'Ivoire -0.83 Haiti -6.74 
Denmark 16.69 Cape Verde 4.78 Armenia -1.51 El Salvador -6.85 
Bosnia & Herzeg. 16.41 Georgia 4.73 Mali -1.61 Timor-Leste -6.89 
Sweden 15.93 United Kingdom 4.50 Rwanda -1.66 
Central African 
Rep. -7.10 
Ukraine 15.72 Tonga 4.48 Turkey -1.84 Mexico -7.13 
Algeria 14.61 Lithuania 4.35 Guinea-Bissau -1.86 Cambodia -7.16 
Hungary 13.72 Tunisia 4.33 Honduras -1.87 Indonesia -7.19 
Italy 13.21 Namibia 4.21 Vanuatu -1.92 Antigua & Barbuda -7.48 
Belgium 13.18 Latvia 3.89 Tanzania -2.04 Palau -7.85 
Serbia 13.07 Luxembourg 3.79 Ireland -2.19 Colombia -8.04 
Guyana 13.03 Eritrea 3.63 China -2.37 Paraguay -8.08 
France 12.57 Vietnam 3.41 Mauritania -2.43 Nigeria -8.62 
Finland 11.55 Tajikistan 3.33 Niger -2.47 Bangladesh -8.70 
Austria 11.43 Senegal 3.30 Mozambique -2.57 Pakistan -8.71 
Mongolia 11.13 Grenada 3.30 Korea, Rep. -2.66 
Dominican  
Republic -8.73 
Cyprus 10.83 Malawi 3.26 Costa Rica -2.69 Panama -9.12 
Bulgaria 10.74 Botswana 3.12 Cameroon -2.72 Iran, Islamic Rep. -9.71 
Papua New Guinea 10.52 Jamaica 2.62 Maldives -2.75 Lebanon -9.74 
Swaziland 10.50 Greece 2.49 Burkina Faso -2.81 Syrian Arab Rep. -10.02
Morocco 10.27 Nicaragua 2.37 Guinea -3.11 Guatemala -10.10
Brazil 10.19 Argentina 2.24 Switzerland -3.14 Yemen -10.12
Czech Republic 10.18 Slovak Republic 2.21 Trinidad & Tobago -3.15 Malaysia -10.34
Norway 10.17 Albania 2.01 Uganda -3.56 Venezuela -10.35
Liberia 9.09 St. Vincent & Gren. 1.84 Belize -3.76 
Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts. -10.47
Slovenia 9.01 Canada 1.66 Madagascar -3.93 Chad -11.21
Solomon Islands 9.00 Uzbekistan 1.66 Uruguay -4.01 Bhutan -11.27
Russian Federation 8.94 Seyshelles 1.59 Thailand -4.04 Sudan -11.36
Croatia 8.79 Gambia 1.53 Macao, China -4.19 Bahamas, The -11.57
Poland 8.52 Kyrgyz Republic 1.50 Japan -4.22 Gabon -13.84
Kiribati 8.51 Togo 1.43 Sierra Leone -4.63 Congo, Rep. -14.55
Macedonia 8.48 Samoa 1.31 St. Kitts & Nevis -4.65 Singapore -17.09
Portugal 8.22 United Arab Emir. 1.16 United States -4.75 Liechtenstein -17.63
Malta 7.98 Djibouti 1.14 Azerbaijan -4.75 Bermuda -18.14
Netherlands 7.50 Montenegro 0.98 Chile -5.01 Hong Kong, China -18.45
Ghana 7.28 Zambia 0.92 Nepal -5.05 Equatorial Guinea -19.42
Iceland 6.15 Bolivia 0.55 Kazakhstan -5.16 Libya -23.81
Suriname 6.12 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.21 Mauritius -5.39 Bahrain -26.39
Brunei Darrusalam 6.10 Fiji 0.19 Peru -5.88 Kuwait -29.72
Israel 6.06 Jordan 0.18 Comoros -6.01   
Burundi 6.01 Ethiopia 0.14 Marshall Islands -6.06   
Romania 5.99 Kenya 0.10 Lao PDR -6.12   
New Zealand 5.92 St. Lucia 0.09 India -6.12   
South Africa 5.91 Australia 0.03 Ecuador -6.31   
Estonia 5.72   Egypt -6.45   
Note Based on the estimation (I) from Table 2, distance in per cent tax revenue/GDP, average of 2007–08. 
High tax performers: values shaded dark blue. Low tax performers: values shaded dark red. 
 Christian von Haldenwang / Maksym Ivanyna 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 40 
Table 14:  ISO Country Codes 
Afghanistan AFG Djibouti DJI Latvia LVA Rwanda RWA 
Albania ALB Dominica DMA Lebanon LBN Samoa WSM 
Algeria DZA Dominican Rep. DOM Lesotho LSO San Marino SMR 
American Samoa ASM Ecuador ECU Liberia LBR S. Tome & Principe STP 
Andorra ADO Egypt EGY Libya LBY Saudi Arabia SAU 
Angola AGO El Salvador SLV Liechtenstein LIE Senegal SEN 
Anguilla ANG Equat. Guinea GNQ Lithuania LTU Serbia SRB 
Antigua & Barbuda ATG Eritrea ERI Luxembourg LUX Serbia & Montenegro SRM 
Argentina ARG Estonia EST Macao, China MAC Seyshelles SYC 
Armenia ARM Ethiopia ETH Macedonia MKD Sierra Leone SLE 
Aruba ABW Faeroe Islands FRO Madagascar MDG Singapore SGP 
Australia AUS Fiji FJI Malawi MWI Slovak Republic SVK 
Austria AUT Finland FIN Malaysia MYS Slovenia SVN 
Azerbaijan AZE France FRA Maldives MDV Solomon Islands SLB 
Bahamas, The BHS French Polynesia PYF Mali MLI Somalia SOM 
Bahrain BHR Gabon GAB Malta MLT South Africa ZAF 
Bangladesh BGD Gambia GMB Marshall Islands MHL Spain ESP 
Barbados BRB Georgia GEO Mauritania MRT Sri Lanka LKA 
Belarus BLR Germany DEU Mauritius MUS St. Kitts and Nevis KNA 
Belgium BEL Ghana GHA Mayotte MYT St. Lucia LCA 
Belize BLZ Greece GRC Mexico MEX St. Vincent &  Grenad. VCT 
Benin BEN Greenland GRL Micronesia, Fed.Sts. FSM Sudan SDN 
Bermuda BMU Grenada GRD Moldova MDA Suriname SUR 
Bhutan BTN Guam GUM Monaco MCO Swaziland SWZ 
Bolivia BOL Guatemala GTM Mongolia MNG Sweden SWE 
Bosnia & Herzeg. BIH Guernsey GUE Montenegro MNE Switzerland CHE 
Botswana BWA Guinea GIN Morocco MAR Syrian Arab Rep. SYR 
Brazil BRA Guinea-Bissau GNB Mozambique MOZ Taiwan TAI 
Brunei Darrusalam BRN Guyana GUY Myanmar MMR Tajikistan TJK 
Bulgaria BGR Haiti HTI Namibia NAM Tanzania  TZA 
Burkina Faso BFA Honduras HND Nepal NPL Thailand THA 
Burundi BDI Hong Kong, CHN HKG Netherlands NLD Timor-Leste TMP 
Cambodia KHM Hungary HUN Netherlands Ant. ANT Togo TGO 
Cameroon CMR Iceland ISL New Caledonia NCL Tonga TON 
Canada CAN India IND New Zealand NZL Trinidad & Tobago TTO 
Cape Verde CPV Indonesia IDN Nicaragua NIC Tunisia TUN 
Cayman Islands CYM Iran, Isl. Rep. IRN Niger NER Turkey TUR 
Central African 
Rep. CAF Iraq IRQ Nigeria NGA Turkmenistan TKM 
Chad TCD Ireland IRL N. Mariana Islands MNP Tuvalu TUV 
Channel Islands CHI Isle of Men IMY Norway NOR Uganda UGA 
Chile CHL Israel ISR Oman OMN Ukraine UKR 
China CHN Italy ITA Pakistan PAK United Arab  Emirates ARE 
Colombia COL Jamaica JAM Palau PLW United Kingdom GBR 
Comoros COM Japan JPN Panama PAN United States USA 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR Jordan JOR Papua New Guinea PNG Uruguay URY 
Congo, Rep. COG Kazakhstan KAZ Paraguay PRY Uzbekistan UZB 
Cook Islands COO Kenya KEN Peru PER Vanuatu VUT 
Costa Rica CRI Kiribati KIR Philippines PHL Venezuela VEN 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK Poland POL Vietnam VNM 
Croatia HRV Korea, Rep. KOR Portugal PRT Virgin Islands (U.S.) VIR 
Cuba CUB Kosovo KOS Puerto Rico PRI West Bank & Gaza WBG 
Cyprus CYP Kuwait KWT Qatar QAT Yemen YEM 
Czech Republic CZE Kyrgyz Rep. KGZ Romania ROM Zambia ZMB 
Denmark DNK Lao PDR LAO Russian Federation RUS Zimbabwe ZWE 
Note Source:  WDI (2009) 
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